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Who Owns the City? Pension Fund Capitalism and the Parkdale Rent
Strike
JAMIE SHILTON*
Canadian public pension funds play an increasingly significant role as institutional
investors, including in the domestic residential property market. Some scholars have
suggested that pension fund investments of this kind result in a form of public ownership,
sometimes characterized as “pension fund socialism.” However, the actual character of
pension fund investment in Canada is much more akin to a financialized pension fund
capitalism, with public pension funds adopting investment strategies consistent with
private financial market actors. In the summer of 2017, tenants and housing activists in
Toronto’s Parkdale neighbourhood organized a successful rent strike against their
corporate landlord as well as the Alberta pension fund that co-owned the buildings. The
strategies developed during the rent strike, including calling on and working with the
unions and union members whose pensions are invested with that fund, serve as examples
for other activists grappling with pension fund capitalism.

IN THE SPRING AND SUMMER OF 2017, hundreds of tenants in the working-class Toronto
neighbourhood of Parkdale organized what was likely the most successful rent strike in recent
Canadian history. Their primary goal was to challenge major rent increases proposed by their
landlord, which for years was reported to have neglected longer-term tenants’ needs for basic
repairs. The buildings where tenants withheld rent were jointly owned by a rental property
management company and the Alberta Investment Management Corporation (AIMCo), which
invests pension funds linked to the government of Alberta. Seeking to force the landlord to
negotiate a settlement, Rent Strike organizers developed a strategy that specifically targeted
AIMCo. Organizers demonstrated outside of AIMCo’s Bay Street office, worked with allies to
draw attention to the issue at a Canadian Labour Congress Convention, and reached out to workers
and activists in Alberta. With pressure mounting, the landlord agreed to negotiate a conclusion to
the Rent Strike, ultimately making considerable concessions to tenants.
The role of AIMCo in the 2017 Parkdale Rent Strike raises some interesting questions as
to the role of public pension funds in the private rental market, in relation to tenants’ rights
activism, and in the economy more generally. In the past few decades, pension funds in Canada
have grown significantly and now control trillions of dollars’ worth of assets around the world. As
part of this expansion, pension funds have made significant investments in the rental property
market, effectively becoming landlords for many thousands of tenants. The political character of
public pension funds has been a topic of considerable debate, with some scholars emphasizing the
potential,l for a kind of “pension fund socialism” where pension capital is mobilized by workers
according to democratic principles and in response to social need. Others have highlighted the
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contradiction between the progressive face of labour unions and public sector employers and the
reality of the value-maximizing investment practices of public pension funds.
In the context of the rental housing market, the capitalist investment strategies broadly
adopted by Canadian public pension funds are likely to contribute to displacement and
gentrification in neighbourhoods like Parkdale. This is exemplified by the experience of the tenants
involved in the Parkdale Rent Strike, who, living under a pension fund landlord, recognized the
relationship between major rent increases and their landlord’s preference for new, higher-income
tenants. However, Rent Strike organizers also identified certain characteristics that distinguished
their landlord from others. For these organizers, the key difference between public pension funds
and other financialized1 investors in the rental housing market was that the former are unusually
sensitive to public pressure, since many funds have institutional links to progressive, democratic,
and membership-based unions. These characteristics make public pension funds particularly
susceptible to the strategies developed by tenants and organizers during the Rent Strike. Given the
success of these strategies, I argue that housing rights activists confronting pension fund landlords,
and perhaps other organizers seeking to challenge pension fund investment practices, have much
to learn from the experience of the Parkdale Rent Strike.
I begin this article with an overview of public pension funds in Canada, including their
transformation into financialized global investors in the last few decades and their even more
recent shift toward investments in rental properties. Second, I review the debates over “pension
fund socialism” and explain the divergent positions on the prospects of democratizing the economy
through strategic pension fund investments. In the third section, I argue that despite any prospects
for alternative models, pension funds today have adopted many of the investment strategies
developed by other more straight-forwardly-capitalist actors in the financial industry. Next, I
explore how landlords have attempted to manage costs and earn profits in capitalist rental housing
markets, and further explain how financialized landlords, such as pension funds, are likely to
accelerate the processes of neighbourhood gentrification and displacement. Finally, I provide an
account of the Parkdale Rent Strike drawn from interviews with key organizers and contemporary
media reports, with specific attention paid to the successful strategy for targeting AIMCo.

I. CAPITALIST CRISIS AND THE RISE OF PUBLIC PENSION
FUNDS IN CANADA
The reach of Canada’s public pension funds extends far beyond the high-rise apartments in
Parkdale where the Rent Strike took place. In 2017, these investors owned one-third of one of
Australia’s largest rail freight services,2 a chain of shopping malls in Brazil, 3 10,000 acres of

Financialization refers to the process of “structural changes in the operation of capitalism in which finance has come
to play an increasingly dominant role in the economy and everyday life”: Martine August & Alan Walks,
“Gentrification, Suburban Decline, and the Financialization of Multi-Family Rental Housing: The Case of Toronto”
(2018) 89 Geoforum 124 at 124. August and Walks define “financialized landlords” as including “real estate
investment trusts [REITs], private equity funds, financial asset management firms, and other investment vehicles”:
ibid at 121.
2
Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, Investing for our Contributions & Beneficiaries: 2017 Annual Report
(Canada, 2017) at 15, online: <cppib.com/documents/1591/2017_Annual_Report.pdf> [perma.cc/TW8X-2W6G].
3
Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, A Plan for All Seasons: 2016 Annual Report (Ontario, 2016) at 81, online:
<otpp.com/documents/10179/771876/-/aaaf4912-f652-4ba4-8c6c-ce28b9894fd9/Annual+Report.pdf>
[perma.cc/8TU7-N6TQ].
1
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almond orchards in California, 4 and a major stake in the largest privatized water utility in the
United Kingdom.5 Together, these funds control as much as fifteen per cent of all assets in the
Canadian financial system. 6 However, the current scale of public pension plans, and their global
reach, can obscure the fact that they were not always professionalized investment entities, and it
was never inevitable that they would take their current form. Rather, it was capitalist crisis, as well
as the related rise of neoliberal politics, which drove the transformation and financialization of
public pension plans in Canada.
The term “public pension plan” refers to any of the workplace pension plans for public
sector employees, some of which are established by statute, as well as the Canada Pension Plan
(CPP), the broader federal program that pays out retirement income based on contributions made
by all income-earners outside Québec.7 Today, all of these public pension plans have established
institutional forms permitting them to manage and invest plan member contributions in order to
earn returns and fund retirement income. The Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB),
which invests those CPP funds not needed to pay current pension obligations, is the largest of these
entities. Aside from the CPPIB, the Bank of Canada identifies seven other large funds which
manage the pensions of public employees: the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec (CDPQ),
the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTTP), the British Columbia Investment Management
Corporation (BCI), the Public Sector Pension Investment Board (PSPIB), the Ontario Municipal
Employees Retirement System (OMERS), the Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan (HOOPP), and
AIMCo.8
The initial creation of public pension plans in Canada was itself a political development.
For example, the CPP was established in 1965 amidst a surge in labour militancy and efforts by
the state to placate workers.9 At the outset, the manner in which pension plans funded retirement
income reflected this origin in social democratic politics. From the inception of the CPP, and for
much of the history of other public sector pension plans, the prevailing funding model was known
as “pay-as-you-go” (PAYGO), in which retirement income was funded by current contributions
from workers and/or government sponsors.10 For most of these pension plans, the investment of
any surpluses not needed to pay out current benefits was limited to the purchase of government
bonds.11 While government bonds provided a valuable source of credit for funding state
investments, they were far less profitable than private market investments. Unable to earn
additional returns through private investment, the capacity of pension plans to maintain benefit
levels was primarily dependent on robust, stable economic growth, which would ensure a steadily4

Public Sector Pension Investment Board, Investing: Annual Report 2017 (Canada, 2017) at 45, online:
<investpsp.com/pdf/PSP-AR-2017-complete.pdf> [perma.cc/JF4Z-6GXC].
5
“Infrastructure Portfolio – Thames Water,” online: Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System
<omersinfrastructure.com/Investments/Portfolio/Thames-Water> [perma.cc/FYZ9-2F84].
6
Guillaume Bédard-Pagé et al, “Large Canadian Public Pension Funds: A Financial System Perspective” in Bank of
Canada, Financial System Review (June 2016) 33 at 33.
7
World Bank Group, The Evolution of the Canadian Pension Model: Practical Lessons for Building World-class
Pension Organizations (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank,
2017) at 4. Québec has an independent pension plan which invests funds in assets through the Caisse de dépôt et
placement du Québec: Michael Mendelson, Financing the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans (Washington, DC:
AARP Public Policy Institute, 2005) at iii.
8
Bédard-Pagé et al, supra note 6 at 33.
9
John Myles, Old Age in the Welfare State: The Political Economy of Public Pensions, revised ed (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1989) at 134.
10
Ibid at 164.
11
World Bank Group, supra note 7 at 7.
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increasing stream of contributions in proportion to the obligations owed to a growing pool of
retirees.12
During the decades of sustained economic growth following the Second World War, the
PAYGO model appeared to be functioning well. However, with the decline of growth in advanced
capitalist countries in the 1970s and 1980s, the economic viability of this and other social
democratic arrangements could not be so easily ensured. Faced with declining profits, investors
and corporate managers organized to assert their class interests during this time by lobbying for
lower taxation and less costly forms of regulation, as well as by suppressing working-class
movements, including trade unions, which posed any opposition.13 Federal and provincial
governments across Canada pursued neoliberal policies characterized by a retrenchment in public
spending, particularly on welfare programs, and an overall ideological shift away from postwar
social democratic arrangements in favour of capitalist market-provisioning of basic goods.14 These
reforms tended to vastly increase public deficits, ultimately empowering the financial market
actors that held government debt. Financial markets imposed fiscal discipline by demanding
further cutbacks in public spending and market-friendly reforms of social democratic programs.15
The financialization of public pensions was key to this restructuring. In the late 1980s,
Ontario embarked upon a program of public pension reform that was later emulated by other
jurisdictions.16 Amidst concerns over the fiscal burden imposed by the PAYGO model, Ontario
commissioned a number of expert reports which recommended that its major public sector pension
funds be reorganized as professionalized, arms-length entities empowered to invest in the market.17
These recommendations were quickly implemented: Ontario’s Public Service Pension Act, 1989
came into force at the end of 1989 and created the Public Service Pension Board, now the Ontario
Pension Board (OPB), while the Teachers’ Pension Act was enacted in 1990 restructure the
OTPP.18 Reform of the OPSEU Pension Trust soon followed, with its investment arm commencing
operations in 1995.19 These reforms granted the OPB, OTPP, and OPSEU Pension Trust statutory
authority to invest surplus funds in private market securities. While expanding pension plans’
ability to earn returns through financial investments, the Ontario reforms also established the
“jointly-sponsored pension plan” model, which makes employers and unions both responsible for
funding shortfalls, thereby exposing workers to financial risk that was previously borne
exclusively by the state.20 A similar story unfolded in British Columbia, where the Public Sector
Pension Plans Act inaugurated the BCI in 1999.21 AIMCo, though founded somewhat later in
2008, replicates many of the institutional innovations that came out of the Ontario reforms. 22

12

Robin Blackburn, Banking on Death, or Investing in Life: The History and Future of Pensions (London: Verso
Books, 2002) at 69.
13
Leo Panitch & Sam Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire (New
York: Verso Books, 2012) at 163–72; Stephen McBride, Paradigm Shift: Globalization and the Canadian State, 2nd
ed (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2005) at 53–58.
14
McBride, supra note 13 at 98–99.
15
Wolfgang Streeck, “The Crises of Democratic Capitalism” (2011) 71 New Left Rev 5 at 14–16.
16
World Bank Group, supra note 7 at 7.
17
Ibid at 8.
18
Public Service Pension Act, 1989, SO 1989, c 73; Teachers' Pension Act, RSO 1990, c T1.
19
World Bank Group, supra note 7 at 7.
20
Elizabeth Shilton, Empty Promises: Why Workplace Pension Law Doesn’t Deliver Pensions (Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2016) at 164–68.
21
SBC 1999, c 44.
22
World Bank Group, supra note 7 at 16.
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In the same period, the federal government was slashing spending on a wide range of social
programs, and as in the provinces, public pension reform was high on the agenda. In 1998, in
response to concerns about the long-term viability of the CPP’s PAYGO model, the federal
Liberals reduced benefits, drastically increased the rates at which workers were required to
contribute to the CPP, and passed the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act.23 This statute
established the CPPIB and gave it a mandate to, according to the text of the Act, “invest its assets
with a view to achieving a maximum rate of return, without undue risk of loss …”24
The institutional capacity and legal authority of pension funds to seek returns in private
markets was enhanced through deregulation and other reforms over the course of the 1990s and
2000s. Deregulation in the pension sector included the elimination of investment rules in federal
tax legislation that had been intended to concentrate investments in domestic markets and reduce
exposure to financial risk. For instance, the foreign property rule, which until 1990 had limited
institutional investors’ ownership of foreign assets to just ten per cent of their total portfolio
value,25 was progressively softened and then finally abolished in 2005.26 Additionally, in Ontario,
public pension funds were for years subject to the “30 per cent rule,” which prevented ownership
of more than thirty per cent of the voting shares of a company. 27 While pension funds have
generally been successful in circumventing this rule,28 its planned elimination by the Ontario
government will likely give funds greater flexibility.29 Owing to such reforms, financialized public
pension funds have been able to freely invest in securities markets, with the total market value of
the assets under their control ballooning from $161 billion in 1993 to well over $1.4 trillion in the
first quarter of 2020.30
Shifts in the broader landscape of the capitalist economy have further driven changes in
the composition of pension fund investments, with the investment practices of public pension
funds shifting in response to crises and opportunities. The entry of pension funds into the
residential rental market, for instance, is in large part a response to the financial crisis of 2008–09
and the economic instability that followed. The balance sheets of many public pension funds
suffered greatly during that crisis, with the portfolio of the CDPQ alone losing nearly $40 billion,
or 14.5 per cent of the total value of its managed assets, in 2008.31 Since the crisis, interest rates in
Canada and most other advanced capitalist countries have remained low, and pension fund
investors have turned to so-called “alternative investments” in asset categories like real estate and
infrastructure in order to earn sufficient returns.32 These assets are particularly attractive to pension
23

SC 1997, c 40 [Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act].
Ibid at s 5(c); Murray Cooke, “The Canada Pension Plan Goes to Market” (2003) 51 Can Rev Soc Policy 126.
25
David Burgess & Joel Fried, “Canadian Retirement Savings Plans and the Foreign Property Rule” (1999) 25:3 Can
Pub Pol’y 395 at 397.
26
Bédard-Pagé et al, supra note 6 at 36.
27
Ontario, Report of the Expert Commission on Pensions, A Fine Balance: Safe Pensions, Affordable Plans, Fair
Rules (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2008) at 85.
28
Ibid.
29
Department of Finance Canada, “Pension Plan Investment in Canada: The 30 Per Cent Rule,” online: Government
of Canada <fin.gc.ca/activty/consult/ppic-prpc-eng.asp> [perma.cc/24LU-45TY].
30
Statistics Canada, “Trusteed pension funds, market and book value of assets, by private and public sector category,
quarterly (dollars),” Table 11-10-0076-01, DOI: <doi.org/10.25318/1110007601-eng>.
31
Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec, Annual Report, 2008 (Québec, 2008) at 3, online:
<cdpq.com/sites/default/files/medias/pdf/en/ra/ra2008_rapport_annuel_en.pdf> [perma.cc/TKB5-E9E4].
32
Lawrence Schembri, “Double Coincidence of Needs: Pension Funds and Financial Stability” (Remarks delivered at
the Pension Investment Association of Canada Spring Conference, Quebec City, 15 May 2014) at 5, Bank of Canada,
online: <bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/remarks-150514.pdf> [perma.cc/YB3U-NETT].
24
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funds because they are thought to provide stable, long-term revenue streams that correspond with
the long-term obligations of funds to pension beneficiaries.33 As such, they also permit fund
managers to hedge against the risk of shorter-term investments failing. 34 Canadian public sector
pension funds may be particularly inclined toward this approach, with at least one study finding
that pension funds associated with defined-benefit pensions, such as the Canadian public plans,
are more likely to seek out long-term investments such as real estate.35 With ongoing instability in
financial markets, it seems that public pension fund investments in alternative investments,
including residential rental properties, is likely to continue.
This abbreviated history of the growth and financialization of public pension funds in
Canada illustrates the relationship between shifts in the capitalist economy and the changing
institutional forms of these funds. In addition to the initial establishment of pension plan
investment boards as a response to the crises of the 1970s and 1980s, the move into private rental
housing—and the consequent emergence of the pension fund landlord—was one response to the
crisis of 2008–09. The current form of Canadian public pension funds, then, is historically
contingent, rather than necessary or inevitable. Recognizing this, it becomes easier to imagine
alternative forms of organizing the retirement income system and its relationship to broader
society.

II. PENSION FUND SOCIALISM?
The growth and transformation of public pension funds over the last few decades have prompted
debates as to their political character. According to one line of argument, when pension funds
invest workers’ contributions, those workers gain some kind of interest in the assets and enterprises
owned by the pension fund. Some have argued that we are already living under a system of
“pension fund socialism” in which workers, through the investment decisions made by pension
fund managers, can direct massive amounts of capital toward pro-worker, environmentallysustainable, and socially-responsible investments. Have the workers seized the means of
production without anyone really noticing?
The first version of this thesis was advanced by Peter Drucker, a US business theorist who
posited that pension fund socialism had arrived in his 1976 book, The Unseen Revolution: How
Pension Fund Socialism Came to America.36 At that time, though pension funds in the US were
significantly smaller than they are today, Drucker made the provocative claim that:
Indeed, aside from farming, a larger sector of the American economy is owned today
by the American worker through his investment agent, the pension fund, than Allende
in Chile had brought under government ownership to make Chile a “Socialist country,”
than Castro’s Cuba has actually nationalized, or than had been nationalized in Hungary
or Poland at the height of Stalinism. 37
33

Bédard-Pagé et al, supra note 6 at 35.
Fund managers for defined-contribution pension plans, on the other hand, may be more likely to make riskier
investments given that fund beneficiaries, rather than sponsors, bear much of the financial risk: See William H Simon,
“The Prospects of Pension Fund Socialism” (1993) 14:2 BJELL 251 at 255.
35
Gordon Clark, “Pension Fund Capitalism: A Causal Analysis” (1998) 80:3 Geografiska Annaler 139 at 150–51
[Clark, “Pension Fund Capitalism”].
36
Peter F Drucker, The Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America (New York: Harper &
Row, 1976).
37
Ibid at 2.
34
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Beyond serving as vehicles for worker ownership of enterprises, pension funds enabled deeper
“socialization” of the capitalist economy, with the profits of those enterprises returned directly to
workers as retirement income. “There is no ‘surplus value’,” remarked Drucker, as “business
revenue goes into the ‘wage fund’.”38
While conventional accounts of socialist transformation centre the working class,
Drucker’s version of socialism was at first an initiative of corporate managers:
Socialism came to America neither through the ballot box nor through the class
struggle let alone a revolutionary uprising … it was brought about by the most unlikely
revolutionary of them all – the chief executive officer of America’s largest
manufacturing company, General Motors.39
In Drucker’s narrative, the President of GM laid the groundwork for pension fund socialism in
1950 by creating the first employer-sponsored pension fund to invest in the private market. Similar
plans then proliferated among US corporations, and the deferred wages of workers were
increasingly used to buy up stakes in capitalist enterprises.
Clearly, Drucker’s version of socialism bears little resemblance to common understandings
of the term. Rather than the socialist tradition, Drucker’s work draws on theories of managerialism
that were popular at the time to describe a society of organized capitalism administered by rational
corporate managers. “In a society in which the performance of all major social tasks is entrusted
to large institutions,” wrote Drucker, “management becomes, of necessity, the central organ and
the central social function.”40 Drucker’s work follows other accounts of organized society by
contemporary researchers like John Kenneth Galbraith. In The New Industrial State, Galbraith
envisioned a world in which the corporation “disenfranchises its stockholders,”41 and would be
operated by enlightened managers committed to rational planning 42 and limited competition
between monopolistic enterprises so as to secure stable, if not extravagant, profits.43 While
Drucker had a similar vision of organized society, free of class conflict, his corporations would
not so much disenfranchise profit-driven investors as they would realign their objectives with
worker-owners’ goals of ensuring steady returns to fund retirement income. This seems a far cry
from ideas of socialism that envision production for the fulfillment of human need, rather than for
profit, among other goals.
While it is clear that Drucker overstated the extent of pension fund ownership of the US
economy in 1976, the notion of pension fund socialism as propositional politics has found favour
among some other writers. Such an argument is made by Robin Blackburn in Banking on Death,
which begins with an observation of a new contradiction between the enormous global scale of
pension funds, as well as the enrichment of fund managers, and the imperilment of the relatively
generous pensions won by workers in the decades after the Second World War. 44
Blackburn locates the cause of this contradiction in the absence of any democratic
accountability of pension fund managers to individual pension beneficiaries. While pension funds
38

Ibid at 3.
Ibid at 5.
40
Ibid at 114.
41
John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967) at 73.
42
Ibid at 74.
43
Ibid at 82.
44
Blackburn, supra note 12 at 7.
39
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as institutions have become tremendously wealthy and powerful, “[t]he policyholders in a pension
fund, whatever the type, have no direct purchase or control over the assets which are held to finance
their pension.”45 For Blackburn, this is one result of the legal structure of the pension system in
Anglo-American economies, according to which pension funds are organized into trusts whose
beneficiaries are, by design, alienated from the decision-making of the trustee. 46 Trustees are
legally bound, as fiduciaries, to make investment decisions according to variations on the “prudent
expert” rule, rather than democratic input from beneficiaries.47 Typically, the role of the fiduciary
in this context is to maximize returns on investment for the benefit of those who are entitled to
pension income in retirement.48 A statutory version of this rule is applied to the CPPIB, whose
governing legislation requires it to “to invest its assets with a view to achieving a maximum rate
of return, without undue risk of loss.”49 While pension fund trustees may in some circumstances
pursue ethical investment strategies, the imperative to maintain retirement income for beneficiaries
means that the need to ensure profitability remains likely to prevail in any conflict with other
objectives. As a result, pension fund managers have been known to make investment decisions
that run counter to the interests of pension beneficiaries, for instance by downgrading defined
benefit plans to defined contribution plans, or even by investing in enterprises that compete with
the employers of the beneficiaries.50
For Blackburn, this state of affairs need not continue indefinitely. By restructuring the legal
foundation of pension funds to give workers greater control over investment decisions, pension
funds could become the basis for democratizing the economy.51 If the laws underpinning pension
funds required that investments be made on bases other than maximization of returns, workers
could commit pension capital to a “socially responsible industrial policy” in order to transform the
economy and reinforce worker control. Rather than leaving investment decisions to private, profitdriven interests, pension funds could invest in social infrastructure, such as the “educational
system, communications, research facilities, and cultural endowment” 52—public goods that, in
Blackburn’s view, it “would be inappropriate to subordinate to profit criteria.”53 The ongoing
viability of these institutions would be left up to the democratic input of pension beneficiaries,
rather than the impersonal logic of the market. Blackburn’s vision would amount to a radical
transformation of society and, as he writes, “such a profound, if also curious, alteration in property

45

Ibid at 123.
Ibid at 125.
47
Ibid.
48
See Cowan v Scargill, [1985] Ch 270 at 287 [HC], for Megarry VC’s classic statement as to the duties of pension
trustees:
When the purpose of the trust is to provide financial benefits for the beneficiaries, as is usually the case,
the best interests of the beneficiaries are normally their best financial interests. In the case of a power
of investment, as in the present case, the power must be exercised so as to yield the best return for the
beneficiaries, judged in relation to the risks of the investments in question; and the prospects of the yield
of income and capital appreciation both have to be considered in judging the return from the investment.
Scholarly debate over the content of the fiduciary duty has continued, with some critics strongly dissenting from the
classical position expressed by Megarry VC. For an argument that the fiduciary duty might require trustees to consider
factors other than profit maximization, see Cynthia A Williams & John M Conley, “Is There an Emerging Fiduciary
Duty to Consider Human Rights?” (2007) 5:4 Intl J Civ Soc L 130.
49
Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act, supra note 23, s 5(c).
50
Blackburn, supra note 12 at 127–29.
51
Ibid at 476.
52
Ibid at 481.
53
Ibid at 491.
46
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relations almost certainly could not be sustained without provoking a fundamental rupture with
capitalist social relations.”54
While Blackburn is at times optimistic about the prospects of pension fund socialism,
William Simon emphasizes the barriers that stand in the way of democratizing pension funds and
directing their investments toward socially-useful objectives. First, if workers were to take control
over pension funds, they would be more exposed to the risk of loss from failing investments.55 By
contrast, in today’s pension plans, the risk of loss is generally borne by the plan sponsor—in most
cases, the employer. Second, that risk of loss, and the management techniques employed to reduce
it, would likely open up conflicts between different groups of workers. For instance, retirees
interested in protecting their retirement income might demand that their funds deliver high returns
on invested funds. A demand for profit and value maximization is likely to conflict with the
interests of currently-employed workers, who for themselves demand higher wages and better
working conditions in the present.56 For current workers, it may be that it does not much matter
whether the shareholders pressuring management to cut costs are pension funds controlled by
workers or hedge funds controlled by capitalist investors. Due to these contradictions, Simon
concludes that “it is unlikely that pension reform will obviate the need for other means of worker
ownership and protection.”57

III. PENSION FUND CAPITALISM
Whatever the future promise of pension fund socialism, the contemporary forms of Canadian
public pension funds bear far more resemblance to the sophisticated capitalist investment firms
that populate Bay Street and Wall Street than they do to vehicles for socialist transformation. As
we have seen, the growth and financialization of public pension funds in the 1980s and 1990s was
itself a product of neoliberal reforms intended to reduce fiscal burdens on the state in an era of
retrenchment in public spending. As Blackburn observed, pension funds today are managed by
actors who are bound by legal duties to maximize returns. In order to achieve the objectives
intended by neoliberal reformers, public pension fund managers have adopted many of the forms
and practices developed in the broader financial industry.58
One telling example of this is public pension funds’ reliance on benchmarks and growth
targets. Public pension funds, like other actors in the finance industry generally, tend to measure
their performance in terms of growth in asset values—specifically, their asset-value growth rate
measured against a benchmark rate derived from a “composite index.”59 According to this metric,
it is not enough for an asset to be producing income—its value must appreciate year-over-year, at
a higher rate than the benchmark, for it to be considered a worthwhile investment. Pension fund
managers therefore have strong incentive to exercise stakeholder influence over the internal
operations of their investments in order to encourage growth and maximize their own returns.
54
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Indeed, in a paper written in the early 1990s extolling the benefits of Canadian institutional
investors such as pension funds, Jeffrey G MacIntosh writes that “institutional investors have
lower coordination costs … more resources at their command and, as a result of their relatively
large shareholdings, much better incentives to monitor management”. 60
In his book Wall Street, Doug Henwood shows how pension funds in the US participated
in the “shareholder value” movement during the 1990s, in which investors moved aggressively to
overturn the management-centred corporate order championed by Galbraith and Drucker. 61 Not
content with the goal of securing stable, if unspectacular, profits, shareholders exerted their power
through techniques including “publicly pressuring management to increase payouts and adopt
‘value-enhancing’ policies, pushing for seats on the board [of directors], sponsoring resolutions,
and threatening to sell their shares en masse,” as well as, most dramatically, threatened or actual
hostile takeovers of corporations.62 Managers were therefore pressured into restructuring firms to
pursue the more straightforward objectives of maximizing share values, and consequently, the
values of investors’ stock portfolios. In pursuit of this maximization, pension fund managers,
alongside their private investor counterparts, directed corporations to lay off workers, take hard
lines in bargaining with unions, reduce capital expenditures and other forms of investment, and
pursue opportunities for corporate consolidation through mergers and acquisitions.63
Canada’s public pension plans have embraced these strategies for maximizing asset value
and investment income. For example, the BCI states in its 2017–18 Annual Report that its
managers are focused on “identifying inefficiencies and value creation opportunities within the
public and private markets.”64 According to the OTPP, its managers are “known for rolling up
[their] sleeves, and working with leadership at the companies we partner with” to “build their
businesses and create value.”65 Similarly, in 2001, the CPPIB adopted an “active management”
investment policy including initiatives to support corporate restructuring.66 While active
management policies do not always involve direct intervention in corporate operations, such
policies do encourage close, continuous monitoring of asset performance. This can mean that the
large investor’s latent power over the business—to cease or withdraw investment in response to
poor performance—itself disciplines corporate managers into acting in accordance with investors’
objectives. The deregulation of investment rules, including the planned elimination of the “30 per
cent rule” in Ontario, may enable public pension funds to exert even greater pressure on
management. Interventionist and active management practices may to an extent be distinguished
from the general practice of public pension funds participating in less socially-desirable lines of
business, such as the CPPIB’s investments in arms manufacturers such as Raytheon, Lockheed
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Martin, and BAE Systems.67 However, both approaches reflect a prioritization of value
maximization above other possible goals.
On a sociological level, Canada’s large public pension funds are now staffed by many of
the same kinds of people who administer other large investment firms. When pension funds first
entered private securities markets, they tended to lack specialized staff, and were forced to rely
heavily on external financial service providers in areas such as investment and asset
management.68 Now, however, public pension funds boast of the investment acumen wielded by
their own staff.69 In order to bring financial market expertise in-house, public pension funds have
made salaries competitive with their private sector peers. As a result, where investment board
executives are public servants subject to salary disclosure rules, they often comprise some of the
highest-paid employees on the government’s payroll.70 Canadian public pension funds have also
followed their private sector peers abroad. Many public pension funds now have operations
spanning the globe, reflecting the international reach of their investments.71 For example,
alongside its headquarters in the heart of Toronto’s Financial District, the CPPIB has outposts in
Midtown Manhattan, London, Luxembourg, Mumbai, Hong Kong, Sydney, and São Paulo.72 This
list looks modest in comparison to CDPQ, which has offices in Montreal, Quebec City, New Delhi,
London, Mexico City, New York, Paris, Shanghai, Singapore, Sydney, and Washington DC. 73
Canada’s public pension fund staff work with, live with, and participate in the social world of the
global financial elite.
Evidently, since the beginning of the financialization of public pensions in the 1990s,
pension institutions have become deeply integrated into the broader architecture of global financial
capitalism. This poses a serious challenge to those who wish to democratize pension funds, as well
as to the poor and working people whose interests conflict with pension funds’ profit and value
maximization strategies.

IV. HOUSING UNDER CAPITALISM AND THE PENSION
FUND LANDLORD
If pension fund capitalism is the prevailing model, then it seems unlikely that the pension fund
landlord will improve on the practices of any other large capitalist landlord. For tenants, especially
poor and working-class tenants, this is not good news. While headlines about a new housing crisis
have proliferated in recent years, David Madden and Peter Marcuse remind us that “[f]or the
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oppressed, housing is always in crisis.” 74 Capitalism has never supplied housing in adequate
amounts, in decent conditions, at costs affordable to poor and working-class people.75 Friedrich
Engels, describing in 1872 the terrible conditions in which the proletariat of Manchester were
housed, excoriated “[t]he breeding places of disease, the infamous holes and cellars in which the
capitalist mode of production confines our workers night after night.”76 The basic features of rental
housing have not changed significantly since Engels’ time. There continue to be economic
incentives for landlords to terminate unprofitable tenancies and minimize expenditures on
maintenance and upkeep. Further, the strategies according to which landlords have sought to
maximize profits are integral to broader processes of gentrification and the displacement of
working-class communities from their historic neighbourhoods.
The provision of rental housing has always been a low-margin enterprise, at least when it
comes to housing the average tenant. The initial construction of rental properties requires large
capital investment, the return on which may not be realized for decades.77 Once in operation, rental
housing is subject to a relatively high degree of regulation compared to other forms of private
property, including rent control and security of tenure, which limits the extent to which landlords
can control their revenue streams.78 Further, landlords are obligated by statute to maintain rental
properties for the indefinite future, and so must expend considerable resources on repairs and
upkeep.79 For these reasons, private investment in rental housing was historically the domain of
small capitalists who exploited local knowledge and maintained close personal control over their
properties so as to manage costs and ensure profitability.80 One archetypical example is the
slumlord, the lone individual who charges relatively low rent but provides deeply substandard
facilities in return.
It is only more recently that the rental market has become a site of corporate consolidation,
where large landlords with many properties use managerial techniques to reduce costs and increase
revenues. In my experience as a housing caseworker in downtown Toronto, these techniques
included cost-cutting measures such as replacing in-building superintendents with centralized
maintenance call centres (calls to which would only on rare occasions result in action), and
revenue-increasing measures such as regularized rent increases and systematic efforts to “buy out”
long-term tenants (for example, by exchanging lump sum cash payments for agreements to
terminate unprofitable tenancies). The extent of corporate consolidation in the rental market is
evidenced by developments such as the $20 billion merger between Invitation Homes, a subsidiary
of the hedge fund Blackstone, and Starwood Waypoint, a real estate investment trust,81 as well as
the high-profile purchase of thousands of rental units in Montreal and Toronto by Swedish
multinational Akelius over the past decade.82 In an instance of consolidation with local
significance for Parkdale, in 2018 the Wynn Group sold eighteen rental buildings, including the
74
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infamous West Lodge Towers, to Timbercreek Asset Management and Starlight Investments,
adding thousands of rental units to those portfolios.83 For corporate landlords, this greatlyexpanded scale, planning, and coordination offers a partial answer to the profitability dilemma of
the residential landlord.
Another feature of rental housing in capitalist economies is the absence of economic
incentives for landlords to maintain their properties. Other owners of housing, including owneroccupiers and condominium owners, are both investors and possessors who have an economic
interest in ensuring that a later sale price exceeds a past purchase price. 84 Except perhaps in the
most overheated of property markets, this gives owners incentives to ensure that their properties
are in good states of repair. The main economic interest of landlords, however, is in extracting rent
from tenants. There are few economic incentives bearing on landlords to make repairs so long as
they can still collect rent. This is particularly the case in declining markets where rental income is
low, or where maintenance costs escalate in legacy buildings. 85 Neglect and under-maintenance is
a common issue in Parkdale, where much of the rental housing stock consists of mature buildings
constructed in the 1950s through to the 1970s, and where average rents long remained relatively
low due to rent control and security of tenure. As a result, there have been extreme examples of
under-maintenance in the neighbourhood. For example, in 1994–1995, the West Lodge Towers
were abandoned by their then-owner in an attempt to escape tax, utility, and maintenance bills well
into the millions of dollars.86
Landlords looking to avoid the profitability dilemma have also sought to increase tenant
turnover to attract wealthier tenants who are willing and able to pay more rent. Legislative reforms
since the 1990s have facilitated this strategy. In Ontario, the Progressive Conservative government
under Premier Mike Harris introduced a policy of “vacancy decontrol” in 1998, ending rent control
on vacant units.87 Thus, while tenants in long-term tenancies are protected by rent control
legislation, which restricts landlords to increasing rents by an annual guideline rate based on
inflation,88 once a tenancy ends the landlord may increase that unit’s rent to whatever level the
market will sustain. Vacancy decontrol therefore generates economic incentives to push tenants
out of longer-term, unprofitable tenancies by withholding repairs, initiating bad faith “no fault”
evictions,89 or otherwise pressuring tenants to leave.90 According to housing activist Robert Levitt,
the Harris reforms meant that:
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Unscrupulous landlords will have a financial incentive to force tenants out of their
units so that they can increase the rents under Vacancy Decontrol. As seniors have a
tendency to remain in units the longest, they will be very vulnerable to coercion to get
them out. Those who are unaware of the new laws, especially those with a poorer
command of the English language will also be particularly vulnerable. 91
During my time as a housing caseworker, it was common to deal with examples of landlords
attempting to use coercive and bad faith tactics to force vulnerable tenants out of long-term
tenancies, especially where the property had recently been sold or otherwise passed to new
management.
The Harris reforms also loosened the requirements for obtaining approval of an “above
guideline increase” from what is now the Landlord and Tenant Board. This process enables
landlords to seek the Board’s approval to increase lawful rent by a rate above the annual guideline
set by the Minister of Housing so as to pass on the costs of renovations or improvements to
tenants.92 While the older legislation strictly limited the kinds of capital expenditures and
extraordinary increases in operating costs which could justify an AGI, the post-reform law permits
landlords to charge tenants for purely aesthetic or luxury expenditures such as swimming pools,
lobby televisions, and landscaping. 93 In effect, through the current AGI process, landlords can
charge low-income tenants for the kinds of upgrades intended to attract the higher-income tenants
whom landlords hope will replace existing renters.
Can we expect pension fund landlords to find some way of avoiding, or at least mitigating,
the capitalist market pressures that drive gentrification and displacement? In a study of multifamily rental housing in Toronto, Martine August and Alan Walks explored the techniques used
by financialized landlords—such as private equity firms, real estate investment trusts, and asset
managers—to increase the profitability of residential rental buildings. Landlords of this type first
appeared in Toronto during the mid- to late-1990s and began investing in rental housing to take
advantage of opportunities for high returns brought about by the Harris reforms.94 August and
Walks found that financialized landlords have in large part replicated techniques used by other
types of landlords to make rental housing provisioning profitable. Specifically, they found that
financialized landlords have sought to “squeeze” tenants by increasing rents, imposing new fees,
and reducing services.95 Additionally, financialized landlords have also aimed to “gentrify-byupgrading” via efforts “to reposition buildings through landscaping and upgrading, and to hasten
the removal of sitting tenants to allow for the renovation of their vacant suites” so as “to attract a
more affluent newcomer.”96 While these strategies are familiar to landlords and tenants in
residential housing markets, the financial nature of these landlords introduces new problems.
The primary difference between individual or non-financial corporate landlords and these
financialized landlords is the latter’s deeper integration with financial markets. From the
perspective of financial markets, asset value—abstracted from any concrete or local concerns—is
the most important characteristic of any particular investment. 97 In sophisticated financial
91
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investment firms, asset values are closely monitored using, for example, active management
techniques. When an asset is underperforming, it should be divested in favour of more profitable
investments, or where possible restructured in order to meet the goals of the investor. This constant
monitoring has a disciplinary effect, through which local or immediate managers come under
greater pressure to ensure returns for financial investors. As August and Walks argue, while nonfinancial landlords have always managed their properties in order to earn profits, the additional
value-maximization imperatives imposed by investment markets are likely to intensify and
accelerate the “squeezing” and “gentrifying-by-upgrading” processes.98 Given that public pension
funds have adopted investment strategies common across the financial industry, it should not be
surprising to see pension fund landlords engaged in these same practices, as was the case in the
eyes of many Parkdale tenants leading up to the Rent Strike.
The rise of financialized landlords, including the pension fund landlord, poses new
challenges for tenants and housing activists. One element of this challenge is that it remains unclear
exactly how much of the rental housing stock in Toronto and elsewhere is owned by pension funds.
As Kevin Skerrett notes, “[l]ike hedge funds and private equity funds, Canadian pension funds are
effectively private sector ‘for-profit’ actors whose internal investment operations are subject to
minimal disclosure requirements.”99 A recent report by the Canada Mortgage and Housing
Corporation states that only a tiny fraction of the country’s total rental housing stock is owned by
pension funds, with individual investors and private corporations dominating the overall market. 100
However, the murkiness of corporate ownership makes it likely that the true proportion is much
greater. The buildings involved in the Parkdale Rent Strike, for instance, were legally owned by
private corporations that were in turn jointly owned by AIMCo and MetCap executives. 101
Moreover, several Canadian public pension funds are whole owners of specialized real estate
investment corporations. OMERS, for instance, owns Oxford Properties, which controls a multibillion dollar portfolio including thousands of rental units across Canada,102 while CDPQ’s
subsidiary Ivanhoé Cambridge owns nearly 40,000 units worldwide.103 Thanks to the welldocumented move of public pension funds into alternative investments, it is likely that these
investors will continue to expand their rental property holdings in the coming years.
It seems clear that the “squeezing” and “gentrifying-by-upgrading” processes employed by
all landlords, and in a more aggressive manner by financialized landlords like pension funds, are
contributing to the displacement of working-class tenants from downtown Toronto
neighbourhoods. Toronto’s cost-of-living has skyrocketed in recent decades, with the average rent
98
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for all types of apartments increasing from $907 in 2000104 to $1472 in 2019.105 At the same time,
social assistance rates have declined relative to the poverty line 106 and working income has failed
to keep pace with growth in average rents. 107 For tenants displaced from Parkdale, there are few
other options. The march of gentrification has led to the transformation of the downtown core into
a predominantly white, wealthy enclave. 108 In Toronto’s inner suburbs, where affordable housing
stock remains,109 there is a lower concentration of social services, limited access to public transit,
and a lack of other neighbourhood amenities that make Parkdale unique in Toronto. For these
reasons, as one of the last islands of affordability in Toronto’s downtown, Parkdale has become a
flashpoint between the forces of gentrification and neighbourhood organizers fighting to preserve
a space for workers, migrants, and the poor.110

V. THE PARKDALE RENT STRIKE
The tensions between the asset-value prerogatives of the pension fund landlord and the needs of
poor and working-class tenants came to a head during the 2017 Parkdale Rent Strike. The twelve
buildings where rent was withheld are characteristic of the neighbourhood: all are high-rises
concentrated along Jameson and Tyndall Avenues, and all are legacy buildings that house many
long-term, poor, working class, and migrant tenants. Tenants in these twelve buildings had long
104
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complained of repair issues and neglect by management.111 Despite these concerns, the landlord
applied for and was granted AGIs on an annual basis, claiming that the increases were necessary
to cover the costs of major capital repairs.112 According to tenants, the year-over-year
accumulation of these increases was making the buildings progressively less affordable, especially
for those with fixed and low incomes.113
Faced with an intolerable situation but buoyed by recent victories against corporate
landlords in the neighbourhood,114 in early 2017, tenants and organizers began planning to
withhold rent payments until their landlord cancelled the AGIs—a rent strike. Planning and
organizing for the Rent Strike was first headed by members of Parkdale Organize, a political
organization composed of working-class Parkdale residents. Steadily, more and more tenants
joined these early efforts as momentum built toward the planned commencement of the Rent Strike
on 1 May 2017.115 The strategies that were developed during the early stages of Rent Strike
organizing and then successfully implemented proved highly effective in challenging their pension
fund landlord.
When planning for the Rent Strike, organizers were confronted with a question that tenants
had been pondering for years before: who, exactly, is the landlord? While MetCap Living was
known to be the property manager for the buildings, documents issued by the landlord stated that
rent was to be paid to entities with vague or generic names, some consisting only of the building
address or a numbered corporation.116 Rent Strike organizers, intent on targeting the actors who
were most capable of resolving tenants’ issues, ran title and corporation searches on each company.
It turned out that the buildings had varying ownership structures, with each of them owned by an
individual MetCap executive along with a major co-investor.117 After some digging, organizers
discovered that the business addresses for many of these numbered and generically-named
corporations happened to be the same as AIMCo’s Edmonton headquarters.118
According to key Rent Strike organizers, tenants had varying reactions to learning that their
ultimate landlord was really a massive public pension fund. Some were concerned with the fact
that they were up against not just MetCap, whose executives they knew and whose employees they
interacted with on a regular basis, but also an impersonal, far-away financial corporation. 119
However, the contradiction was clear between the progressive image of AIMCo’s contributors,
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such as the Alberta Union of Provincial Employees (AUPE),120 and the profit-maximization
strategies of the landlord leading up to the strike. 121 Additionally, there was some hope that the
public sector workers linked to AIMCo would be more receptive to the Rent Strikers’ message
than MetCap executives.122 Thus, in the weeks leading up to 1 May 2017, the organizers developed
a plan to target AIMCo directly in the hopes of exposing this contradiction to their advantage.
Rent Strike organizers adopted a multi-pronged strategy of simultaneously creating
negative publicity for AIMCo while building solidarity with public sector workers in Alberta.
Organizers felt that AIMCo would be more susceptible to a public pressure campaign than
MetCap.123 A few days into the strike, tenants rallied outside of AIMCo’s office in Toronto’s
financial district, demanding that the pension fund put pressure on MetCap to negotiate with the
tenants and meet their demands.124 At first, the landlord refused to budge. A few weeks into the
strike, AIMCo’s media team insisted that the corporation still had “full confidence” in MetCap’s
management of the buildings.125 MetCap soon issued eviction notices to hundreds of rent strike
participants.126
In response, the Rent Strikers escalated their efforts by launching a website, provocatively
named www.aimcoevictstenants.ca, which enabled supporters to write to AIMCo executives
demanding that they force MetCap to cease eviction proceedings and negotiate with the tenants.
Allies in Alberta organized a solidarity action outside of AIMCo’s headquarters in Edmonton,
where they handed out leaflets to employees and guests entering and exiting the building.127 As
the “AIMCo Evicts Tenants” campaign gained steam, AIMCo leadership became increasingly
concerned with the negative publicity, both for the fund and for contributors such as the AUPE.128
While the campaign against AIMCo was successful in bringing to light that organization’s
relationship with MetCap, the strategy of winning over support from Alberta’s unionized public
120

The AUPE has openly opposed conservative politics in Alberta, for example by running campaigns against policies
enacted by Jason Kenney’s United Conservative Party. Further, its members in hospitals and correctional facilities
engaged in unlawful wildcat strikes in 2012 and 2013: Alberta Union of Public Employees, “The Trickle-Down Pickle
Part 2: Exactly How Sour Is This Deal?” (28 June 2019), online: <aupe.org/news/news-and-updates/trickle-downpickle-part-2-exactly-how-sour-deal> [perma.cc/LD4X-W45Y]; Josh Wingrove, “Deal ends wildcat strike at Alberta
hospitals,” The Globe and Mail (16 February 2012), online: <theglobeandmail.com/news/national/deal-ends-wildcatstrike-at-alberta-hospitals/article546688/> [perma.cc/BC22-FS93]; Bryan Weismiller & Clara Ho, “AUPE and
province reach deal to end wildcat strike”
Calgary Herald (1 May 2013), online:
<calgaryherald.com/business/AUPE+province+reach+deal+wildcat+strike/8316462/story.html> [perma.cc/9ABQNF5L].
121
Webber, supra note 116.
122
Natola, supra note 119.
123
Ibid.
124
Webber, supra note 116.
125
Kayla Goodfield, “Parkdale tenants facing eviction after protesting rent hikes,” CTV News (24 May 2017), online:
<toronto.ctvnews.ca/parkdale-tenants-facing-eviction-after-protesting-rent-hikes-1.3426835>
[perma.cc/AY3XA8WF].
126
Jessica Patton, “Parkdale tenants who launched rent strike say they’ve been given eviction notices,” Global News
(24 May 2017), online: <globalnews.ca/news/3473811/parkdale-tenants-who-launched-rent-strike-say-theyve-beengiven-eviction-notices/> [perma.cc/FQ2G-YXPP?type=image].
127
Natola, supra note 119; Alberta PIRG, “Outside of AIMCO's offices downtown Edmonton…” (7 June 2017),
posted on Alberta PIRG, online: Facebook
<facebook.com/alberta.pirg/photos/a.900620746654166.1073741826.900620676654173/1386731514709751/?type=
3&theater> [perma.cc/F5H4-CDMZ?type=image]. Public Interest Research Groups (PIRG) are independent, often
campus-based political organizations that exist across Canada and the United States. They are generally focused on
grassroots organizing and other direct advocacy efforts.
128
Natola, supra note 119.

https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp/vol35/iss1/1

18

Shilton: Who Owns the City? Pension Fund Capitalism and the Parkdale Rent

employees may have ultimately been more consequential.129 The Rent Strike happened to coincide
with the triannual convention of the Canadian Labour Congress, held in Toronto in May 2017.
This brought together union members from across Canada, including members of the AUPE.
Organizers sought support from union activists—in particular those affiliated with the Canadian
Union of Public Employees, Local 3902, which represents academic workers at the University of
Toronto130—to bring the issues facing Rent Strikers to the attention of convention attendees.
Activists supporting the Rent Strike ran an information picket outside of the convention in the
hopes of reaching out to representatives of the AUPE, while others scrambled, ultimately
unsuccessfully, to arrange a meeting with the convention’s keynote speaker, Alberta Premier
Rachel Notley.131
Efforts to forge solidarity between Parkdale tenants and unionized public employees in
Alberta paid off. Across social media channels, AUPE leadership expressed sympathy with the
tenants’ struggle against what they described as “unfair and potentially illegal rent hikes.”132
Further, AUPE President Guy Smith promised to express the union’s concerns to AIMCo, and to
continue to monitor the issue as events in the Rent Strike progressed. 133As a result of the campaign
by Rent Strike organizers, not long after AIMCo had expressed “full confidence” in MetCap, the
combined pressures of withheld rent, negative media coverage, and AUPE efforts forced both
MetCap and AIMCo to negotiate with the tenants.134
In the final stages of the Rent Strike, the impact of the organizers’ strategy was clear. At a
series of meetings in the summer of 2017, tenant representatives, supported by legal workers from
Parkdale Community Legal Services, sat across the bargaining table not just from MetCap
executives, but representatives of AIMCo as well. 135 Tenants advanced the demands they had
pursued since the early planning for the Rent Strike: the AGIs needed to be dropped, and
maintenance needed to be completed. The result of these negotiations was a series of confidential
agreements, one for each building, in which the landlord agreed to significant reductions in the
planned rent increases and made commitments to carry out much-needed repairs. 136 Additionally,
AIMCo and MetCap proposed a “rent relief program” that promised to protect tenants facing
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financial hardship from future AGIs.137 After the first such agreement was signed in early August
2017, the Rent Strike concluded and the Tenants declared victory. 138
Tenants and organizers consider the Rent Strike to be a significant achievement. Not only
were tenants able to push back against decades of increasing costs and diminishing services, but
they also demonstrated that collectively, they were capable of confronting big corporations and
their economic interests. Moreover, the strategies for challenging pension fund landlords
developed by strike organizers offer a model for future tenant struggles as pension funds continue
to move into the rental housing market.

VI. CONCLUSION
The success of the Parkdale Rent Strike demonstrates that pension fund landlords, despite their
billions of dollars in assets and commitments to maximizing returns, are not immovable objects.
Specifically, in comparison to other institutional investors, public pension funds appear unusually
susceptible to public pressure campaigns. Public pension funds retain their origins in public sector
unions, or in the case of the CPPIB, a social democratic program of the federal government.
Additionally, most have institutional links with unions, though these relationships are more
significant in some funds than others.139 Public pension funds therefore have an interest in
cultivating a positive public image that is distinct from the perceived rapaciousness of hedge funds
and private equity firms. Public pressure campaigns may force trustees and fund managers to
consider institutional histories when making investment decisions. In the Rent Strike, for instance,
AIMCo became concerned that its MetCap investment would undermine its relatively progressive
image as the trustee of deferred union wages. This led the fund to intervene and force MetCap to
negotiate a settlement with the Parkdale tenants. It seems less likely that a hedge fund or real estate
investment trust would arrive at a similar conclusion.
Of course, tenants’ successes in shifting the costs of maintenance and long-term tenancies
back onto their landlords will likely cut into the asset values and investment income sought by
pension fund managers and other investors. Given the constraints of profitability in the private
rental market, can this strategy lead to anything other than disinvestment in the long term? Engels
was pessimistic about the prospect of reforming the system that housed people in those “infamous
holes and cellars,” writing that “[a]s long as the capitalist mode of production continues to exist it
is folly to hope for an isolated settlement of the housing question … [t]he solution lies in the
abolition of the capitalist mode of production … .”140 Whatever it may take to achieve a complete
“settlement” of the housing crisis, the Rent Strike and innumerable other examples of successful
social movements demonstrate that even in our current circumstances, there is considerable room
for maneuver, to push capitalist institutions to assume costs otherwise borne by poor and working
people, and to build power for future struggles.
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